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SLAYERS AND SOLDIERS: THE VALIDITY AND SCOPE
OF THE SLAYER'S RULE UNDER THE FAMILY
SERVICEMEMBERS' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE ACT
Rebecca Blasco
Abstract: The "slayer's rule"-a common law doctrine-precludes a murderer from
financially benefiting from the victim's death by denying him or her the right to proceeds
from the victim's life insurance policy. Some jurisdictions have extended this rule to
disqualify the slayer's exclusive family members from receiving the victim's insurance
proceeds as beneficiaries. Exclusive family members are those either not related to the victim
or related to the victim only by marriage. The slayer's rule applies to federal group life
insurance policies, such as the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance Act (SGLI), which
provides life insurance to servicemembers. Spouses and dependent children of
servicemembers may also receive life insurance under the Family Servicemembers' Group
Life Insurance Act (FSGLI). If the spouse or any of the dependent children covered under the
FSGLI dies, the servicemember is the automatic beneficiary. If the servicemember is
disqualified by the slayer's rule from receiving the benefits and has not designated a
beneficiary, the statute provides an order of precedence for determining designation by law:
the policy goes first to the widow or widower, and then to the children. If there are no
children, the policy then goes to the servicemember's parents. When the servicemember-
slayer's relatives receive the proceeds from the victim-spouse's FSGLI policy, the
servicemember-slayer could benefit indirectly from the killing: the servicemember-slayer's
family members may use the money to support the slayer, or the slayer may inherit or
otherwise control the proceeds. This Comment analyzes the continuing validity and scope of
the slayer's rule with respect to the FSGLI and identifies examples of how the statute's
beneficiary provision leaves open the possibility that the servicemember-slayer could benefit
from the killing. This Comment also addresses the policy concerns courts consider in
determining whether to impose a bright-line, extended rule disqualifying the slayer's
exclusive relatives. Finally, this Comment argues that absent explicit legislative intent to
abrogate the slayer's rule, courts should strictly construe the FSGLI to preserve the rule and
to disqualify the servicemember's exclusive family members when the servicemember is the
slayer.
INTRODUCTION
On July 12, 2005, Spc. Brandon Bare, a soldier who had received a
Purple Heart for combat injuries endured in Iraq, murdered his eighteen-
year-old wife, Nabila Bare, by stabbing her at least seventy-one times
with knives and a meat cleaver.' He had returned to Fort Lewis three
1. Melanthia Mitchell, Soldier's Court-Martial in Wife's Death Set to
Start Monday, THE SEATrLE TIMES, May 14, 2006,




months earlier to recover from his injuries. Investigators found her body
naked with a pentagram carved into her stomach, "knife-like objects
around her head," and a note on her stomach saying, "'Til death do us
part .... Spc. Bare was charged and convicted of premeditated murder
in May 2006.4
Spc. Bare had a life insurance policy under the Servicemembers'
Group Life Insurance Act (SGLI), and his wife had a life insurance
policy under the Family Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance Act
(FSGLI).5 Under the FSGLI, he is the automatic beneficiary on his
wife's life insurance policy. 6 However, because he murdered her, the
slayer's rule bars him from recovering the proceeds.7 Instead, the
proceeds from his wife's policy were distributed under the statute's
order of precedence, or "by law," 8 to Spc. Bare's father because the
Bares had no children. 9 Nabila Bare's parents, now in debt primarily as a
result of her funeral costs, are suing for the insurance payout.' 0
Meanwhile, Spc. Bare's father allegedly has admitted that he plans to
2. Mitchell, Soldier's Court-Martial, supra note 1. He had been in Iraq since October 2004. See
Melanthia Mitchell, Soldier's Trial Begins in Grisly Killing; Court-Martial at Fort Lewis -
Defendant Accused in Wife's Death, THE SEATTLE TIMES, May 16, 2006, at B4 available at
http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgibin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug=courtmartialI 6
m&date=20060516&query=Mitchell%2C+Melanthia [hereinafter Soldier 's Trial].
3. Mitchell, Soldier's Trial, supra note 2.
4. Karen Jowers, Father Fights for Slain Daughter's Insurance Payout, ARMY TIMES, Dec. 25,
2006, at 11, available at http://www.armytimes.com/legacy/new/0-ARMYPAPER-2424631 .php.
5. Id.
6. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(i) (2003).
7. See infra note 70-72 and accompanying text.
8. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a) (providing an order of precedence for beneficiary designations when
the soldier fails to so designate); see also Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 48 (1981) (stating that
the servicemember changed his beneficiary designation to be "by law," referring to the order of
precedence specified in SGLI); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tull, 690 F.2d 848, 848 (4th Cir. 1982)
(addressing distribution of proceeds when servicemember's SGLI "policy provided that its proceeds
should be distributed 'by law'); Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 814 F. Supp. 500, 501 (W.D.
Va. 1993) (addressing distribution of servicemember's SGLI policy when servicemember "had
designated her beneficiaries 'By Law'); U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, SERVICEMEMBERS' &
VETERANS' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE HANDBOOK, Nov. 2002 (Revised Mar. 2007), available at
http://www.insurance.va.gov/sgliSite/handbook/handbook.htm (recommending that servicemembers
who do not wish to designate beneficiaries should indicate payment under the statute's order of
precedence by entering "By Law" on the form) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
9. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a) (2003); Jowers, supra note 4 (stating Spc. Bare's parents are his "sole
remaining" beneficiaries).
10. See Jowers, supra note 4
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use at least a portion of the proceeds to establish a spending account for
Spc. Bare while he remains in prison."
The slayer's rule-the principle of law that disqualifies Spc. Bare
from recovering the proceeds from his wife's policy-stems from
common law principles of equity and prohibits killers from benefiting
from the act of killing. 2 Courts have not yet applied the slayer's rule to
insurance policies procured under the FSGLI, which Congress added to
the SGLI in 2001. 3 Nor have courts considered the situation in which
the servicemember is the slayer,' 4  the victim-spouse is not a
servicemember, and the servicemember-slayer and non-servicemember
spouse have no natural children. Instead, courts have only determined
the payment of proceeds on the servicemember's policy under the SGLI
where the non-servicemember spouse is the slayer.' 5 In these situations,
the courts have not identified a binding rule for determining whether the
slayer's exclusive family members' 6  may receive the victim-
servicemember's life insurance proceeds.' 7 These courts have struggled
to balance the public policy concern underlying the slayer's rule-that
persons should not benefit from their act of killing-with the
consequences of imposing a bright-line, extended rule that denies the
slayer's innocent exclusive family members18 the proceeds.' 9
11. See id.
12. See N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886); Riggs v. Palmer, 22
N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1889).
13. See Veterans' Survivor Benefits Improvements Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-14, §§ 1965,
1967-1970, 115 Stat. 25, 27-30 (2001). The author of this Comment did not come across any cases
considering the slayer's rule under the FSGLI, as opposed to the SGLI. See infra Part Ill.
14. See infra Part III. But see Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 814 F. Supp. 500, 500 (W.D.
Va. 1993) (addressing situation where both spouses were servicemembers without applying the
slayer's rule).
15. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 474 (7th Cir. 1999); Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Tull, 690 F.2d 848, 848 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v.
Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1379 (S.D. Ga. 2004); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Neal, 768 F.
Supp. 195, 197 (W.D. Tex. 1991).
16. This Comment uses the phrase "slayer's exclusive family members" to refer to those family
members who are not blood-relatives of the victim. For example, the slayer's children from a
previous marriage are the slayer's exclusive family members, even though they are the step-children
of the victim-spouse.
17. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476-77 (declining to decide the issue and affirming the lower court's
decision to allow the slayer's exclusive family member to recover); Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at
1381-82 (applying a bright-line, extended slayer's rule to disqualify slayer's exclusive family
members).
18. Innocent family members include those who played no part in the crime, as well as those who
have no intention of supporting the slayer through receipt of the victim's proceeds. See, e.g., In re
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This Comment argues that where the servicemember does the killing
and the FSGLI governs the non-servicemember spouse's life insurance
policy, courts should construe the statute strictly to preserve the common
law slayer's rule.2° Under the canon of strict construction, courts
construe statutes in derogation of common law as consistent with and
preservative of the common law, absent congressional intent to the
2 2contrary. ' The FSGLI is silent on the slayer's rule.22 The minimal
legislative history documenting the FSGLI's inclusion in the SGLI
reveals that Congress intended the statute to provide the servicemember,
his or her spouse, and his or her dependent children with insurance
benefits.23 The legislative history does not discuss the slayer's rule, but
neither does it suggest that Congress intended courts to reach the
unconscionable result whereby the servicemember-slayer may receive
the victim's proceeds indirectly through the slayer's family members.24
Therefore, courts should construe the FSGLI strictly to preserve the
slayer's rule and to disqualify the servicemember-slayer's family
members from receiving the insurance benefits as either designated
beneficiaries or by-law beneficiaries of the non-servicemember spouse's
FSGLI policy. In the case of Spc. Bare, this would mean disqualifying
Spc. Bare's father from receiving the proceeds on the wife's FSGLI
policy.
Part I of this Comment describes the provisions and legislative history
of the SGLI and the FSGLI. Part II discusses the federal common law
slayer's rule, court-identified policy concerns underlying the rule, and
cases in which courts have applied the rule and its extended version to
Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571, 575 (N.Y. 2001) (refusing to disqualify slayer's innocent heirs).
19. See, e.g., Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476-77 (stating it "need not decide" whether to adopt a bright-
line extended federal common law slayer's rule to disqualify all of the slayer's relatives); Tolbert,
320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (endorsing a bright-line extended slayer's rule despite the consequences to
innocent relatives).
20. See infra Part V. Because a wide variety of fact scenarios are possible under the slayer's rule,
this Comment will limit the scope of its discussion by focusing on a limited set of fact patterns and
policy concems.
21. See Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879); see generally 3 NORMAN J. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61:1 (6th ed. 2001) (explaining strict construction of
statutes in derogation of common law); infra Part IV.
22. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-1979 (2003).
23. See Veterans' Survivor Benefits Improvements Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-14, §§ 1965,
1967-1970, 115 Stat. 25, 26-30 (2001); H.R. REP. NO. 107-27, at 1, 16-17, 21-23, 29, 32, 39-44
(2001), as reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 23, 30-36.




disqualify the slayer's family members. Part III explains how courts
have applied the common law slayer's rule under the SGLI and
discusses the lack of a clear rule for determining how far the slayer's
rule extends in precluding family members from beneficiary status under
the SGLI. Part IV addresses the canon of strict statutory construction
courts use in interpreting statutes in derogation of common law and
considers courts' rationale for applying this canon. Finally, Part V
argues that courts should interpret the FSGLI's beneficiary provision
strictly to preserve the common law slayer's rule. A strict interpretation
will ensure that courts avoid the unconscionable result of putting the
servicemember-slayer in a position to benefit financially, through family
members, from the killing.
I. THE FSGLI PROVIDES AUTOMATIC LIFE INSURANCE
COVERAGE TO SERVICEMEMBERS' SPOUSES AND
DEPENDENT CHILDREN
In 1965, Congress enacted the Servicemembers' Group Life
Insurance Act (SGLI) "to provide special indemnity insurance for
members of the Armed Forces serving in combat zones. 25 Under the
SGLI, servicemembers may either specifically designate beneficiaries or
elect to have beneficiaries designated "by law" according to the statute's
order of precedence. 6 In 2001, Congress amended the SGLI to extend
life insurance coverage to servicemembers' spouses and dependent
children.27 The Family Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance Act
(FSGLI)28  a provision housed within and operating in conjunction with
the SGLI-provides that the servicemember is the automatic beneficiary
if the insured spouse or any of the insured dependent children dies. 29 If
the servicemember cannot take the proceeds because of death or another
25. See Uniformed Services--Group Life Insurance, Pub. L. No. 89-214, §§ 765-76, 79 Stat.
880, 880 (1965). Congress amended the popular name of the Act from Servicemens' Group Life
Insurance Act to Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance Act in 1997. See S. REP. No. 104-371, at
15 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3762, 3766, 3770.
26. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at chs. 6.02, 6.06. See, e.g., Ridgway v.
Ridgway 454 U.S. 46, 48 (1981) (addressing the situation in which servicemember "changed the
policy's beneficiary designation to one directing that its proceeds be paid as specified 'by law');
Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 814 F. Supp. 500, 501 (W.D. Va. 1993) (addressing situation in
which servicemember's SGLI policy indicated she had designated her beneficiaries "By Law").
27. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965, 1967-1970, 115 Stat. at 26-30.
28. See id. § 1967(a).
29. See id. § 1970(i).
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disqualifying reason,3° the SGLI's beneficiary provision controls
payment of proceeds.
31
A. The SGLI Provides Automatic Life Insurance to Servicemembers
Congress's purpose in enacting the SGLI in 196532 was to establish a
group life insurance program whereby private insurance companies
would provide coverage for uniformed servicemembers on active duty.33
Congress passed the SGLI in response to two factors. First, as hostilities
and casualties increased in Vietnam, private insurance companies began
restricting coverage of servicemembers.34 Second, the National Service
Life Insurance Act of 1940 (NSLI),35 a predecessor program that had
36 bprovided servicemembers with life insurance, ceased to be enforced
after the Korean War.37 Because the NSLI "had been allowed to lapse, 38
30. See id. § 1970(b) (providing alternatives for when "payment to such person [otherwise
entitled to payment under this section] ... is prohibited by [f]ederal statute or regulation"); see also
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Neal, 768 F. Supp. 195, 198 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (interpreting 38 U.S.C.
§ 1970(b) as barring persons from recovery not only when prohibited by federal statute or
regulation, but also when equitable principles such as the slayer's rule apply).
31. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a), (i).
32. Sept. 29, 1965. See Uniformed Services-Group Life Insurance, Pub. L. No. 89-214, §§ 765-
76, 79 Stat. 880, 880 (1965). The U.S. Supreme Court provided a thorough discussion of the SGLI's
statutory background in Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 50-53 (1981). In that case, the
servicemember had originally designated his first wife as the beneficiary of his policy and upon
divorce a state divorce judgment was entered ordering him "to keep in force the life insurance
policies on his life now outstanding for the benefit of [his] three children." Id. at 48. However, four
months after the divorce, he remarried and six days after that, changed his policy's beneficiary
designation to be paid "by law." Id. He died just over one year later. Id. at 49. Under the changed
beneficiary designation, the servicemember's second wife would receive the SGLI proceeds. Id.
Both wives filed claims for the proceeds. Id. The Court held the SGLI preempted state law,
including the state divorce judgment, and therefore the second wife was the proper beneficiary, not
the first wife or the children from the first marriage. See id. at 60-63.
33. H.R. REP. No. 89-1003, at 15 (1965) as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3232, 3232-33.
Legislative history indicates Congress's concern with providing survivorship protection for
nondependent parents and siblings. See id. at 16-18.
34. See Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 50.
35. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1929 (2003).
36. Congress enacted the NSLI in 1940 "to furnish to service men at low cost insurance otherwise
unobtainable." United States v. Morrell, 204 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1953). The War Risk insurance
Act of 1917 preceded the NSLI. See Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 51 n.3. Congress passed that program
during World War I. See id.; see also Parker v. Office of Servicemembers' Group Life Ins., 91 F.
Supp. 2d 820, 822 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (describing history of federally-funded life insurance programs
for servicemembers).
37. See Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 50-51 (explaining that after the Korean hostilities, "commercial
insurance generally became available to service members"); S. REP. No. 91-398, at 1 (1969), as
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servicemembers in active military service could not receive federal life
insurance.39 Servicemembers serving in combat zones, such as Vietnam,
also could not obtain private life insurance "at standard rates and without
war exclusion clauses., 40 The combined effect left servicemembers on
active duty with no means of obtaining life insurance.4a
The SGLI provides automatic life insurance to any servicemember
falling within its statutory definitions. 42 Today, these definitions include
a wide range of members43 on "active duty, 44  "active duty for
training, '45 and "inactive duty for training.', 46 A servicemember must
affirmatively opt out if he or she does not want SGLI coverage.47
Servicemembers have great discretion in designating beneficiaries
under the SGLI.48 Specifically, the servicemember may designate as
beneficiaries "any person, firm, corporation or legal entity (including the
insured's estate), individually or as a trustee. 4 9 If the servicemember
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3318.
38. Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 50-51.
39. See id.; see also S. REP. NO. 91-398, at I (explaining that "[b]etween 1956 and 1969 persons
in active military service were not covered under [flederal legislation unless they still retained
Government life insurance obtained prior to April 25, 1951").
40. H.R. REP. No. 89-1003, at 16 (1965).
41. See Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 50-51.
42. See 38 U.S.C. § 1967(a)(1) (2003). At its inception, the SGLI only provided coverage to
servicemembers in the "uniformed services" on "active duty." See Pub. L. No. 89-214, § 767, 79
Stat. 880 (1965); see also 38 U.S.C. § 1965(6) (defining "uniformed services"); id. § 1965(l)
(defining "active duty"). Congress has since expanded both the "eligibility for coverage and the
amount of insurance available," Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 51, as well as increased the policy amount
from $10,000 to the current amount of $400,000. See 38 U.S.C. § 1967(a)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2007);
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 1012, 119 Stat. 231, 244-47 (2005); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch.
1.12. For a quick summary of amendments expanding eligibility and coverage under the SGLI, see
HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 1.
43. See 38 U.S.C. § 1965(5)(A)-(D) (defining "member"); see also id. § 1965(6) (defining
"uniformed services").
44. See id. § 1965(I)(A)-(D) (defining "active duty").
45. See id. § 1965(2)(AHD) (defining "active duty for training").
46. See id. § 1965(3)(A)-(B) (defining "inactive duty training").
47. See id. § 1967(a)(2)(A); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 3.01.
48. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 53 (1981); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 6.02
(explaining that the servicemember has discretion to designate primary and contingent beneficiaries,
and to assign "fractions, percentages, or monetary amounts" to be paid to each beneficiary).
49. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 6.01; see also Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 53 (providing the same).
Additionally, the servicemember may change beneficiary designations at any time without the
consent or knowledge of the beneficiary, though if that beneficiary is a spouse, the spouse will be
notified of the change. See 38 C.F.R. § 9.4(b) (2007); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 6.05.
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does not designate any beneficiaries, the policy goes to the
servicemember's family members according to the statute's order of
precedence. 50  Electing to have beneficiaries designated under this
provision is referred to as designating beneficiaries "by law." 51 Under
the statute's order of precedence, the proceeds will go first to the widow
or widower, followed by the servicemember's children, parents,
executor or administrator, and finally the servicemember's next of kin.52
Thus, the servicemember has a wide choice in designating
beneficiaries, 53  but if the servicemember does not designate
beneficiaries, the servicemember's relatives generally become the
beneficiaries by law.54
B. The FSGLI Extends Automatic Life Insurance to the
Servicemember's Spouse and Dependent Children and Makes the
Servicemember the Automatic Beneficiary on These Policies
In June 2001, Congress approved an amendment to the SGLI
extending life insurance coverage to the families of servicemembers.55
Congress's purpose in enacting the FSGLI was to provide affordable
coverage to servicemembers' families.56 To that end, it added "insurable
dependent[s], 57 defined as the servicemember's current spouse58 and
children,59 to the SGLI's statutory definitions of insured persons.
60
50. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 6.06 ("If a member does not
designate a beneficiary, the insurance will automatically be paid in the.., order of precedence.").
51. See Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 48 (describing situation where servicemember changed his SGLI
policy to be paid "by law" under the statute's order of precedence); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch.
6.02 ("If a member does not want to designate a specific beneficiary but prefers the proceeds to be
paid in the order of precedence, the member should enter 'By Law' in the appropriate space on the
form.").
52. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a).
53. See Ridgway, 454 U.S. at 56 ("There can be no doubt that Congress was aware of the breadth
of the freedom of choice accorded the service member under the SGLIA.").
54. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a).
55. See Veterans' Survivor Benefits Improvements Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-14, §§ 1965,
1967-1970, 115 Stat. 25, 25-30 (2001).
56. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-27, at 17 (2001), as reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 23, 23 (codifying
FSGLI would enable "the Secretary of Defense .. to negotiate premium rates that will be much
more favorable to the servicemember than would be available on the open market"); 38 U.S.C.
§§ 1965, 1967-1970, 115 Stat. at 25-30. The FSGLI is embedded in various provisions within the
SGLI; it does not exist as a separate statutory scheme. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 1970(i).
57. 38 U.S.C. § 1965(10); see id. §§ 1965, 1967-1970, 115 Stat. at 25-30.
58. See HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 10.02 (defining persons eligible for FSGLI program as
"current" spouses though the statute itself, 38 U.S.C. § 1965(10)(A), does not use the language
Vol. 82:967, 2007
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If any insurable dependent covered by an FSGLI policy dies, the
servicemember is, by operation of law, the automatic beneficiary. 61 The
non-servicemember insured may not designate alternative beneficiaries
to the policy. 6 The servicemember's death63 or disqualification 64 from
such automatic beneficiary status triggers the SGLI's beneficiary
provision.65 In these situations, the proceeds, by operation of law, go "to
the person or persons entitled to receive payment of the proceeds of
insurance on the member's life."66 Therefore, the insurance benefits go
first to the servicemember's designated beneficiaries and if none, then to
the servicemember's beneficiaries under the SGLI's statutory order of
precedence.67 This statutory procedure has two important implications:
first, the servicemember designates beneficiaries under both the SGLI
"current").
59. 38 U.S.C. § 1965(10)(B). While the statute does not define children, see id., the
SERVICEMEMBERS' AND VETERANS' GROUP LIFE INSURANCE HANDBOOK does. See HANDBOOK,
supra note 8, at ch. 10.02. The FSGLI covers the servicemembers' "unmarried dependent children."
HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 10.01. Dependent children are:
"(1) All unmarried natural bom children and legally adopted children under the age of 18. (2)
All unmarried stepchildren under the age of 18 who are members of the servicemembers [sic]
household. (3) Any unmarried dependent child who, after attaining the age of 18 and until
completion of education or training (but not after attaining the age of 23), is pursuing a course
of instruction at an approved educational institution. (4) Any unmarried dependent child who
has been declared permanently incapable of self-support before the age of 18."
HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 10.02.
60. See 38 U.S.C. § 1967(a)(1)(A), (C) (2003); id. §§ 1965, 1967-1970, 115 Stat. at 25-30. The
FSGLI provides life insurance only. See HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 10.01. The FSGLI
provides up to $ 100,000 of coverage for the servicemember's spouse and $10,000 for dependent
children. See 38 U.S.C. § 1967(a)(3)(A).
61. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(i) (providing "[a]ny amount of insurance in force on an insurable
dependent of a member under this subchapter ... on the date of the dependent's death shall be paid,
upon the establishment of a valid claim therefor, to the member .... ); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at
ch. 10.01(f) ("FSGLI is a servicemembers' benefit, and the member is the beneficiary of the
policy.").
62. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 1970; HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 6, ch. 10.09(a). However,
the non-servicemember spouse may elect to convert the policy into a private policy upon
termination of the servicemember spouse's policy. See 38 U.S.C. § 1968(b)(3)(A).
63. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(i).
64. See, e.g., id. § 1970(b) (contemplating payment of insurance benefits where beneficiary "is
prohibited by [flederal statute or regulation"); see also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Neal, 768 F.
Supp. 195, 198 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (interpreting former 38 U.S.C. § 770(b), the current 38 U.S.C.
§ 1970(b), as disqualifying slayer-beneficiaries).
65. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(i); supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
66. 38 U.S.C. § 1970(i).
67. See id. § 1970(a), (i); supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
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and the embedded FSGLI;68 and second, in the absence of designation, if
the servicemember is disqualified from receiving the proceeds, the
servicemember's relatives, not those of the insurable dependent, will
likely be the beneficiaries on the insurable dependent's FSGLI policy
under the statute's order of precedence.69
In sum, the SGLI ensures automatic life insurance to servicemembers,
while the FSGLI, a recent amendment to the SGLI, extends that
automatic life insurance to spouses and dependent children of
servicemembers. Under both programs, the servicemember determines
beneficiary designations and is the automatic beneficiary by law in the
context of FSGLI policies. Where the servicemember is disqualified
from automatic beneficiary status, the proceeds are distributed under the
SGLI's beneficiary provision to the servicemember's designated
beneficiaries or to those falling under the SGLI's order of precedence
provision.
II. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW SLAYER'S RULE STEMS
FROM PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND APPLIES UNDER THE
SGLI
The equitable principle that wrongdoers should not benefit from their
criminal acts forms the basis of the slayer's rule.7 ° Most courts agree that
68. Other statutory procedures also emphasize the servicemember's control over FSGLI policies.
For example, the servicemember may reduce or cancel spousal coverage at any time, or may elect
not to insure the spouse at all. See HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 10.06; 38 U.S.C.
§ 1967(a)(2)(B) (servicemember may elect in writing not to insure spouse); 38 U.S.C. § 1967(t)(1)
(Supp. 2007).
69. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a), (i); supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (articulating the
public policy underlying slayer's rule); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 475
(7th Cir. 1999) (disqualifying the slayer from receiving proceeds under the SGLI, and citing the
"principle that no person shall be permitted to benefit from the consequences of his or her
wrongdoing"); Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 1942) (disqualifying slayer and
identifying "a well established public policy against payment of insurance to the murderer of the
insured"); Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (explaining
that in Georgia slayers may be barred from beneficiary status by statute and by "the common law
rule that no one may profit from their own wrongdoing"); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tolbert, 320
F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2004) (disqualifying slayer from receiving proceeds under the
SGLI "because public policy (the 'slayer's rule') generally precludes killers ... from benefitting
[sic] from their victim's death"); In re Estate of Mueller, 655 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (Il. App. Ct. 1995)
(refusing to construe state slayer's statute to allow slayer's children to recover because doing so
would enable the slayer to receive the proceeds through the children in contradiction with "the
strong public policy that murderers should be denied the fruits of their crimes." (quoting In re Estate
of Vallerius, 629 N.E.2d 1185, 1189 (111. App. Ct. 1994)); Heinzman v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 1164,
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the act of killing the insured disqualifies the killer from recovering
directly, as primary beneficiary,7' the proceeds on the victim-insured's
policy.72 Some courts apply an "extended slayer's rule" to effectuate the
policy underlying the rule, holding that in some circumstances, the
slayer's exclusive relatives are also barred from receiving the benefits.
7 3
However, no universally accepted bright-line, extended slayer's rule
1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (disqualifying both slayer and slayer's heirs and stating that "[w]ell-
established principles of equity require that neither one who takes property as a result of feloniously
killing his spouse nor his heirs benefit from such wrongdoing"). The Court of Appeals of New York
stated in 1889:
"No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong,
or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These
maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all
civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes."
Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889); see also Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule:
Not Solely a Matter of Equity, 71 IOWA L. REV. 489, 490 (1986) (discussing the purpose and
foundation of the slayer's rule, as well as the courts' role in creating the rule absent legislative
enactments).
71. This Comment draws a distinction between the slayer recovering directly and indirectly. For
purposes of this Comment, recovering directly means recovering as a primary beneficiary, while
recovering indirectly means recovering through another beneficiary who passes the proceeds, or
benefits of the proceeds, to the slayer. While there may be situations where the slayer is the
contingent beneficiary under the policy terms and kills both the insured and the primary beneficiary
to reach the policy proceeds, for sake of clarity, this Comment focuses on the situation where the
slayer is the designated primary beneficiary or the beneficiary by order of precedence under the
policy's terms.
72. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475-76 (citing N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 117 U.S. at 600; Riggs, 22
N.E. at 190-91; Swietlik v. United States, 779 F.2d 1306, 1306-07 (7th Cir. 1985)). But see Jones
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 814 F. Supp. 500, 501-02 (W.D. Va. 1993) (allowing husband-
servicemember to recover wife-servicemember's SGLI policy where wife died in car accident in
which husband-servicemember had been driving drunk, but where there was no evidence the
husband intended to murder his wife or that Prudential knew or should have known the husband
may have been disqualified); Owens v. Owens, 6 S.E. 794, 794-95 (N.C. 1888) (allowing slayer to
inherit under intestacy statute where statute only prohibited adulterers from recovery); Fellows,
supra note 70, at 491 n.8 (identifying instances when courts rejected the slayer rule because "they
felt constrained to apply property statutes").
73. See, e.g., Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (advocating a bright-line extended slayer's rule); In
re Estate of Mueller, 655 N.E.2d at 1047 (disqualifying slayer's children); Heinzman, 694 N.E.2d at
1167-68 (holding that equity requires disqualifying slayer's heirs); Crawford v. Coleman, 726
S.W.2d 9, 11 (Tex. 1987) (construing state slayer's statute as disqualifying slayer's son and mother
from recovering victim's proceeds as contingent beneficiaries and instead requiring distribution of
proceeds to the victim-insured's nearest relative); Estate of Safran, 306 N.W.2d 27, 37 (Wis. 198 1)
(precluding slayer's unborn children under rule that "persons directly related to the murderer are
disqualified with him" and considering "the interests of children neither bom nor conceived to be
too remote to consider an exception under the facts of this case"). But see Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476-
77 (declining to decide whether a uniform, federal extended slayer's rule disqualifying the slayer's
relatives should exist); In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571, 575 (N.Y. 2001) (allowing innocent
family members to recover proceeds).
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exists, and whether a court applies the extended slayer's rule depends on
the facts and circumstances of a given case.74
A. The Mandate of the Slayer's Rule Is Based on the Policy Concern
that Slayers Should Not Benefit from the Criminal Act of Killing
Directly as Primary Beneficiaries
The slayer's rule is a fundamental common law rule rooted in*
principles of equity and public policy. 75 It mandates that "no man shall
be permitted to profit by his own wrongful act.",76 The U.S. Supreme
Court articulated the policy behind the rule in 1886, stating "[i]t would
be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover
insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had
feloniously taken., 77 The rule effectively disqualifies murderers from
inheriting from their victims directly as primary beneficiary, whether by
will, intestacy statute, or life insurance policy.
78
74. Compare In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d at 574 (addressing distribution under a husband
and wife's joint will of couple's individual, independently-owned property, joint property with a
right of survivorship, and individual assets with named beneficiaries, and stating "where a victim's
will makes bequests to the wrongdoer's family-innocent distributees-their status as legatees
under the victim's will is not vitiated, and they are not disinherited by virtue of their familial
relationship to the wrongdoer") with Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381-82 (applying a bright-line,
extended slayer's rule to disqualify a slayer's family members from receiving the victim-
servicemember's SGLI policy proceeds).
75. See United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847, 851 (E.D. Mich. 1950); see also Riggs,
22 N.E. at 190 (explaining that the common law slayer's rule is based on fundamental maxims of
common law and is "dictated by public policy" that requires courts prohibit profiting by fraud,
wrongdoing, iniquity, or crime).
76. See Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. at 851. Courts generally hold that killings done in a state of
insanity or out of self-defense do not fall under the rule. See Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389, 398-99
(Md. 1986) (insanity); see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Fogle, 419 S.E.2d 825, 827-28 (S.C. Ct. App.
1992) (self-defense).
77. N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (holding the assignee under
an endowment policy payable to the assured or his assigns or legal representatives "forfeited all
rights under it when, to secure its immediate payment, he murdered the assured").
78. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475-76 ("The principle that no person shall be permitted to benefit
from the consequences of his or her wrongdoing has long been applied to disqualify murderers from
inheriting from their victims, whether the route of inheritance is a will, an intestacy statute, or a life
insurance policy."). See also Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816, 819 (7th Cir. 1942) ("Our laws
will not reward one for the commission of crime, and whenever the effect of the enforcement of a
right which one would otherwise have, would be to give her an advantage by reason of her felonious
act, the courts will decline to entertain it because it is contrary to the good order of society, and an
encouragement to crime to allow a beneficiary who murders the insured to receive the benefits of
the insurance.").
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Nearly every state has enacted a slayer's statute codifying the
common law rule barring killers from receiving the victim's life
insurance proceeds as the primary beneficiary. 79 Nevertheless, courts
have concluded that the common law slayer's rule applies regardless of
whether a state or federal statute expressly gives it effect 80 and have
applied the common law rule to "control the effect and nullify the
language"81 of beneficiary designations in wills and life insurance
policies. 82 Hence, the common law slayer's rule has retained its vitality
despite the emergence of codified law.
83
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 8.4, Reporter's Note (2003) (explaining the "slayer-
rule is codified in most states"); 26B C.J.S. Descent and Distribution §§ 57-58 (2001) ("Many
states have enacted 'slayer statutes' intended to prevent a person who has feloniously caused the
death of a decedent from inheriting or receiving any part of the estate of that decedent."). These
statutes vary with regard to the elements required to disqualify the slayer, as well as the method of
distribution upon disqualification. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. § 8.4; 26B C.J.S.,
Descent and Distribution, § 58. Some statutes and jurisdictions treat felonious, intentional, reckless,
or negligent homicides differently. See generally F.S. Tinio, Annotation, Killing of Insured by
Beneficiary as Affecting Life Insurance or Its Proceeds, 27 A.L.R.3d 794 (1969), (Supp. 2007). For
instance, the Revised Uniform Probate Code (UPC), adopted in some states, limits disqualification
to felonious and intentional killings, but excludes accidental manslaughter killings. See UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b), cmt. (2001) (amended 1993 and 1997).
80. See, e.g., Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476 (stating slayer's rule "is undoubtedly an implicit provision"
of the SGLI); Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615 (M.D.N.C. 2005)
(concluding under either North Carolina's slayer statute or under federal common law slayer's rule,
slayer could not recover the victim's ERISA benefits); Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190 (explaining slayer's
rule has its "foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and [has] nowhere
been superseded by statutes"); Heinzman v. Mason, 694 N.E.2d 1164, 1167 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)
(stating "even in the absence of statutory authority, a court may properly" rely on its powers of
equity to enforce the common law slayer's rule).
81. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190 (applying common law slayer's rule to preclude slayer-grandson from
inheriting under victim-grandfather's will).
82. See, e.g., Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475-76 (slayer's rule applies to disqualify slayers from
inheriting from victims "whether the route of inheritance is a will, an intestacy statute, or a life
insurance policy"); In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571, 575-76 (N.Y. 2001) (applying slayer's
rule to inheritance under will and refusing to disqualify slayer's innocent heirs); In re Estate of
Mueller, 655 N.E.2d 1040, 1042, 1047 (I11. App. Ct. 1995) (applying slayer's rule to inheritance
under will and disqualifying slayer-wife's child, who was not victim's natural bom child).
83. Codified law includes state slayer's statutes and the Revised Uniform Probate Code. See
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b), supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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B. Courts Have Applied an "Extended Slayer's Rule " to Disqualify
the Slayer's Family Members Where a Contrary Ruling Would
Result in Allowing the Slayer to Benefit Indirectly
While courts generally agree that principles of equity compel
disqualifying the slayer from directly benefiting as the primary
84beneficiary, some courts have also adopted an "extended slayer's rule"
to preclude the slayer's exclusive family members from receiving the
proceeds.85 The courts that have disqualified the slayer's exclusive
relatives, including innocent relatives, reason that a contrary ruling risks
placing the slayer in a position to benefit from the killing indirectly
through such family members.86 Specifically, these courts reason that the
potential for this kind of indirect benefit frustrates the equitable principle
underlying the slayer's rule.87 Cases that apply an extended slayer's rule
identify two main avenues 88 whereby the slayer could indirectly benefit
84. See supra notes 70-72, 75-83 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380, 1382 (S.D. Ga.
2004) (disqualifying slayer's brother and mother and noting "public policy (the 'slayer's rule')
generally precludes killers, and sometimes their families, from benefiting from their victim's
death"); Heinzman, 694 N.E.2d at 1167-68 (disqualifying slayer's heirs); In re Estate of Cox, 380
P.2d 584, 590-91 (Mont. 1963) (disqualifying slayer's heirs).
86. See, e.g., Beck v. Downey, 198 F.2d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 1952) (Alger Fee, J., concurring) ("In
this case, over and beyond all else, there is the murderer as primary beneficiary and the murderer's
mother as the alternate. If judicial policy dictates that he cannot take directly, no technical
consistency should permit him to benefit indirectly by a gift to his family, especially a mother, from
whom he would normally acquire property by the statutes of descent and distribution."); Tolbert,
320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 (disqualifying slayer's exclusive family members and reasoning bright-line,
extended rule "allays all suspicion" slayer will enjoy "indirect benefits" from the act of killing);
Heinzman, 694 N.E.2d at 1167-68 (concluding that allowing slayer's "heirs to benefit from [the
slayer's] wrongdoing would, in effect, confer a benefit upon [the slayer] as a result of his
wrongdoing," violating slayer's rule and requiring disqualification of slayer's heirs); In re Estate of
Cox, 380 P.2d at 590 (disqualifying the slayer's heirs and stating "who can say it was not the
intention of the murderer to benefit his heirs when he took the life of his wife").
87. See Beck, 198 F.2d at 628 (Alger Fee, J., concurring) (explaining rationale for disqualifying
slayer's mother and stating "[t]he policy is pronounced that neither he [the slayer] nor any who
takes through him or for his benefit should be recognized" as a beneficiary); Tolbert, 320 F. Supp.
2d at 1381; Heinzman, 694 N.E.2d at 1167-68: In re Estate of Cox, 380 P.2d at 590-91 ("If the
logic [disqualifying the slayer] is persuasive in the [slayer], it should be nonetheless persuasive
when applied to the heirs of the murderer.").
88. A third set of cases characterizes fulfilling the slayer's intent as itself a form of benefiting the
slayer. See Heiznman, 694 N.E.2d at 1167; In re Estate of Cox, 380 P.2d at 590. These courts reason
the slayer may have killed the victim-spouse to allow the slayer's children or relatives to benefit
financially from the death; therefore, these courts disqualify the slayer's relatives from beneficiary
status. See Heinzman, 694 N.E.2d at 1167-68 (precluding innocent heirs though slayer had
committed suicide after the killing); In re Estate of Cox, 380 P.2d at 590 (same). In fact, one court
disqualified the slayer's innocent, natural children though the victim, while not adopting the slayer's
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from the killing through exclusive family members: first, where the
slayer's exclusive family member receives the proceeds and uses them to
support the slayer; 89 and second, where the slayer's exclusive family
member receives the proceeds, but the slayer stands to inherit, or
otherwise control, the family member's assets. 9°
1. Courts Have Recognized the Risk that the Slayer's Exclusive
Family Members Could Use the Victim's Life Insurance Proceeds
to Support the Slayer
Courts have identified situations in which the slayer's exclusive
family members could use the proceeds from the victim's policy to
support the slayer.91 In considering the consequences of allowing the
slayer's son (the victim's stepson) to recover, one court contemplated
that the son could use the money to pay for the slayer's attorneys fees, to
buy books or goods for the slayer while in prison, and to support the
slayer once out of prison.92 While the slayer's son nevertheless
recovered in that case,93 a lower district court in different district
children, had raised them. See Heinzman, 694 N.E.2d at 1166-68. In so barring these children, the
court expressly invoked the equitable principle underlying the slayer's rule: "the equitable policy of
[disqualifying slayers from receiving the victim's proceeds by imposing a constructive trust to keep
the proceeds out of the slayer's reach] must apply with equal force to the wrongdoer's heirs even
where the heirs, as here, are completely without fault." Id. at 1168.
89. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 476 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing ways
slayer's son could potentially use SGLI policy proceeds to indirectly benefit slayer); Tolbert, 320 F.
Supp. 2d at 1381 (discussing ways slayer's mother and brother could use SGLI policy proceeds to
indirectly benefit slayer).
90. See In re Estate of Mueller, 655 N.E.2d 1040, 1046 (111. App. Ct. 1995) (disqualifying
slayer's natural child because slayer "is still alive, and is the guardian of her minor child. Under
these circumstances, there exists a danger that [the slayer] could take property through her child...
despite her wrongful and criminal act of murder"); In re Estate of Vallerius, 629 N.E.2d 1185, 1186,
1188-89 (Il1. App. Ct. 1994) (disqualifying two grandsons from inheriting mother's estate where
grandsons had murdered the grandmother who had left her estate to the mother and where grandsons
were the mother's only heirs).
91. See, e.g., Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476-77 (considering ways in which slayer's son could use the
proceeds to benefit the slayer and affirming lower court's judgment, which nevertheless allowed the
son to recover as contingent beneficiary); Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381-82 (discussing ways in
which slayer's mother and brother could use proceeds to benefit slayer and disqualifying both from
recovering as beneficiaries).
92. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476. The policy named the slayer-wife's son as "contingent or
secondary beneficiary." Id. at 474.
93. Though the court affirmed the lower court's judgment allowing the slayer's son to recover the
victim's life insurance policy proceeds, the court so affirmed on grounds other than the policy
concerns it identified as supporting an extended slayer's rule. See id. at 477; infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
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concluded that these examples of benefiting indirectly through family
members compelled precluding the slayer's mother and brother from
recovering the proceeds.
94
2. Courts Have Recognized the Risk that the Slayer Could Inherit or
Control the Victim's Life Insurance Proceeds Through the Slayer's
Exclusive Family Members
Courts have applied an extended slayer's rule to disqualify the
slayer's exclusive family members from recovering the proceeds from
the victim's policy where a contrary ruling would position the slayer to
inherit or control the proceeds.95 For instance, one court addressed how
to distribute proceeds where the victim-husband had designated the
slayer-wife as the primary beneficiary of over one-half of his estate, and
her natural children from a previous marriage as the heirs to her share of
his estate. 96 The slayer-wife in that case murdered her husband to collect
her share of his estate. 97 Because the slayer's rule barred the slayer-wife
from receiving her portion of his estate, the court had to address whether
her minor child98 could receive her portion of his estate under the terms
of the will.99 The court, interpreting the state's probate act, precluded the
slayer's natural child (the victim's stepchild) from receiving her share of
the estate. 100 In doing so, the court reasoned that neither of the slayer's
natural children would have inherited the victim's life insurance policy
94. See Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1380-82.
95. See, e.g., In re Estate of Mueller, 655 N.E.2d at 1046 (interpreting state's probate act and
disqualifying slayer's natural child from receiving proceeds where slayer remained guardian of the
child, thereby controlling the proceeds); In re Estate of Vallerius, 629 N.E.2d at 1188-89
(interpreting state's probate act and disqualifying grandsons from inheriting mother's estate where
grandsons had murdered the grandmother who had left her entire estate to the mother for whom the
grandsons were the sole heirs). See also Beck v. Downey, 198 F.2d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 1952) (Alger
Fee, J., concurring) (disqualifying slayer's mother because slayer would inherit proceeds through
her under statutes of descent and distribution).
96. See In re Estate of Mueller, 655 N.E.2d at 1042-43. The victim-husband originally
bequeathed fifty-percent of his estate to the slayer-wife, but subsequently increased her share to
sixty-percent. See id.
97. See id.
98. Though the will made the slayer-wife's two children heirs, only one was a minor child and
therefore under the slayer's financial control. See id. at 1043, 1046.
99. See id. at 1042-43 (stating the issue as "whether individuals who are named as contingent
beneficiaries in a will may take property under that will when the original taker is precluded ... and
the contingent takers are heirs of the precluded person but not of the testator").
100. See id. at 1046-47.
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under probate law had there been no will. 10 1 Instead, the slayer's natural
children were only in line to inherit their mother's portion of the victim's
estate because the victim named them in the will before their mother
killed him.'12 Further, the court identified policy concerns compelling it
to disqualify the slayer's minor child from beneficiary status: the slayer
was still alive and, as the guardian of the child, could take the victim's
assets through the child. 0 3 Therefore, the slayer could still benefit,
though indirectly through her child, from her criminal act, thereby
effectively allowing her to circumvent the common law rule's mandate
against allowing persons to benefit from acts of killing.' 
04
Additionally, another court decided two natural grandsons were
precluded from inheriting, through their mother's estate, the estate of the
grandmother whom one of them had killed. 0 5 While one of the
grandsons killed the grandmother, the other, at the same time and in the
same place, killed the grandmother's friend. 0 6 The two slayers would
have indirectly benefited from the killing-their mother was their
grandmother's sole heir, and the two slayers were the sole heirs of their
mother. 10 7 Their mother's death of natural causes set the two slayers up
to inherit their victim-grandmother's estate. 0 8 The court interpreted the
state's probate act as disqualifying both persons who directly kill another
person and those who aid, abet, or conspire in the killing of another
person, from recovering the victim's proceeds. 09 Thus, the court
disqualified both slayers from inheriting the portions of their mother's
estate that had come to the mother through the grandmother. 10 In
101. See id. at 1045.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1046. See also In re Estate of Vallerius, 629 N.E.2d 1185, 1188-89 (II. App. Ct.
1994) (precluding two grandsons from inheriting their mother's estate where the grandsons had
killed the grandmother and the mother was the slain grandmother's sole heir).
104. See In re Estate of Mueller, 655 N.E.2d at 1046-47.
105. See In re Estate of Vallerius, 629 N.E.2d at 1188-89. Though this case did not involve the
issue of whether to disqualify the slayer's relatives to preclude the slayer from inheriting the
victim's assets, it illustrates the same principle of disqualifying slayers from benefiting indirectly
from the act of killing-by inheriting the victim's assets through family members. Id.
106. See id. at 1186.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 1186-87.
109. See id. at 1188.
110. See id. at 1188-89. "The plain words of the statute compel us to hold that [the grandson who
did not directly kill the grandmother] cannot be permitted to receive any benefit by reason of the
death of [the grandmother], whether through her estate directly or indirectly through the estate of
her daughter." Id. at 1188. The court did not, however, disqualify the grandsons from inheriting
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reaching this conclusion, the court cited "the strong public policy that
murderers should be denied the fruits of their crimes.""'
On the other hand, courts refusing to apply an extended slayer's rule
reason that when the slayer's family members are innocent of the act of
killing, they should not be disinherited or disqualified by "virtue of their
familial relationship to the wrongdoer."'1 2 For instance, in one case a
court refused to disinherit the wrongdoer's innocent family members
when the victim's will made such family members heirs. 1 3 In that case,
the slayer killed his wife and then committed suicide.1 14 The couple's
shared will provided that in the event one of them died, the property of
the deceased spouse would pass to the surviving spouse, and in the event
both died, certain property would pass to the wife's sister, with the
remaining property "to be distributed into three equal shares," with one-
third going each to the husband's parents, the wife's parents, and the
couple's siblings. 1 5 In refusing to disqualify the slayer-husband's
parents and siblings, the court stated, "[a]bsent a showing that the
[slayer's family members] are anything other than innocent distributees,
[the slayer's rule] is inapplicable."'" 6 The court therefore declined to
invalidate any clause of the will." 7 Other courts have criticized the
property that had been their mother's that "did not come to her through the estate" of the
grandmother. See id. at 1189.
111. Id. at 1189.
112. See In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d 571, 574, 576-77 (N.Y. 2001) (applying principles
of testamentary instrument construction to three forms of property-individual property owned
independently by husband and wife, joint property with a right of survivorship, and individual assets
with named beneficiaries-and holding slayer-husband's parents and siblings not disqualified from
inheriting through the couple's will their portion of his individual assets, his one-half of the joint
tenancy, and his insurance and pension plans when innocent of the wrongdoing). But see Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2004) (adopting bright-line,
extended slayer's rule while acknowledging such a rule could be "perhaps unfair to honest
relatives").
113. See In re Estates of Covert, 761 N.E.2d at 574 (addressing distribution of individual property
owned independently by husband and wife, joint property with a right of survivorship, and
individual assets with named beneficiaries, and holding slayer-husband's parents and siblings not
disqualified from inheriting through the couple's will their portion of his individual assets, his one-
half of the joint tenancy, and his insurance and pension plans when innocent of the wrongdoing);
supra note 112 and accompanying text.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 575.
117. See id. at 576.
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extended slayer's rule as requiring courts to speculate about and
investigate into family dynamics." 8
In sum, while courts universally disqualify the slayer from recovering
as primary beneficiary, they do not uniformly apply an extended slayer's
rule to preclude the slayer's exclusive relatives from beneficiary status in
every circumstance. Courts that have demonstrated a willingness to
apply an extended slayer's rule do so in situations where the slayer could
benefit indirectly through his or her family members. These courts
consider the facts of each case, weighing the circumstances of the
familial relationships and the ways in which the slayer could receive
financial benefits in violation of the fundamental equitable principle that
no person should benefit from the wrongful act of killing.
III. COURTS HAVE APPLIED THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW
SLAYER'S RULE TO THE SGLI
Courts interpreting questions involving the payment of proceeds
under the SGLI that are not answered by the statute have consistently
invoked federal common law.119 Because the SGLI is silent on the
slayer's rule,1 20 courts engage in choice of law analysis and apply the
federal common law slayer's rule, rather than state slayer's statutes, to
fill the gap in the SGLI and to disqualify slayers from primary
beneficiary status. 121 However, courts applying the slayer's rule to the
118. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1999) (identifying
states that have rejected the extended slayer's rule).
119. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 57, 59-60 (1981); Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475; Tolbert,
320 F. Supp. 2d at 1380. However, some courts conclude that under either federal or state law, the
result would be the same: the slayer would be disqualified from beneficiary status. See, e.g., Conn.
Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Riner, 351 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (W.D. Va. 2005) (explaining that the court did
not need to resolve the issue of whether ERISA preempted a state slayer's statute because "the
outcome of this case is the same whether state or federal law applies-[the slayer] is not entitled to
the proceeds of the life insurance policy").
120. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-79 (2003); see also Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476 (stating slayer's rule "is
undoubtedly an implicit provision" of the SGLI); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tull, 690 F.2d 848,
849 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (applying federal common law slayer's rule to preclude slayer
under SGLI); Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1380-81 (concluding court must turn to federal common
law to answer question of whether slayer's family members were disqualified from recovery under
SGLI, because SGLI contains no provisions on the issue and federal law governs); Jones v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 814 F. Supp. 500, 501 (W.D. Va. 1993) (stating the SGLI "makes no
provision for the situation where the designated beneficiary is implicated in the death of the
insured"); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Neal, 768 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (W.D. Tex. 1991)
(applying federal common law slayer's rule to preclude slayer from recovery under SGLI).
121. See, e.g., Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475-76; Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1380-81.
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SGLI have not conclusively determined whether the rule's mandate also
requires disqualifying the non-servicemember slayer's exclusive family
members.122 Although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals weighed the
policy concerns on both sides of the issue, it ultimately did not decide
whether a bright-line rule governing the slayer's rule under the SGLI
should exist, or if so, what its contours should be.'2 3 Instead, that court
limited its holding to affirming the lower court's disqualification of the
non-servicemember slayer only.124 Five years later, a district court in
Georgia picked up where the Seventh Circuit left off and affirmatively
adopted a bright-line, extended slayer's rule that not only precluded the
non-servicemember slayer, but also the non-servicemember slayer's
exclusive relatives from beneficiary status.
25
A. Courts Have Applied the Common Law Slayer's Rule to Fill the
Statutory Gap in the SGLI
Courts deciding questions relating to federal insurance programs look
first to the controlling federal statutes. 126 Where such statutes are silent
on the matter, courts must determine whether to adopt a federal rule of
decision or to invoke state law. 2 7 If the court determines federal law
governs, it will adopt a federal rule of decision. 12 8 A court may apply
federal common law as the federal rule of decision to fill the statutory
interstices. 
29
122. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475-77 (affirming the lower court's decision to allow slayer's
family member to recover under the SGLI); Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381-82 (disqualifying
slayer's family members from recovering under the SGLI).
123. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476-77.
124. See id. at 476-77, 479.
125. See Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381-82.
126. See, e.g., Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475 (looking first to the SGLI to determine distribution of life
insurance policy proceeds when one spouse murders another and, after finding it silent on the issue,
looking to federal common law to fill the gaps) (citing Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,
504-05 (1988); Rollins v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 863 F.2d 1346, 1350 (7th Cir. 1988); Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am. v. King, 453 F.2d 925, 931 (8th Cir. 1971); cf Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 56-
60 (1981); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Christ; 979 F.2d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 1992); Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Tull, 690 F.2d 848, 849 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)).
127. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,726-28 (1979).
128. See id. at 727-28 (explaining that federal programs that must be uniform in character
throughout the country require controlling federal rules); Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475. The court may
incorporate state law as the federal rule of decision. See Kimbell Foods Inc., 440 U.S. at 728.
129. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475 (refusing to borrow state slayer's statutes to fill SGLI's
statutory gaps, and finding that uniform set of rules across jurisdictions is preferable).
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Because the plain language and legislative history of the SGLI are
silent on the slayer's rule, 130  courts determining issues regarding
payment of proceeds under the SGLI must engage in choice of law
analysis.13  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the SGLI preempts and
displaces inconsistent state law.132 Subsequent courts have concluded
that "when a question relating to the interpretation and administration of
an insurance policy issued under" the SGLI "arises that is not answered
by the statute itself, then as with other government contracts ... the
answer is to be supplied by federal common law." 133
Thus, courts have consistently applied federal common law, rather
than state slayer's statutes, in considering the scope of the slayer's rule
under the SGLI. 134 These courts reason that Congress's desire for
uniformity supports applying federal common law to the issue of
distribution of policy proceeds under the statute. 135
130. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-1979 (2003); see also Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
814 F. Supp. 500, 501 (W.D. Va. 1993) (noting the SGLI does not contain a slayer's rule provision).
131. See, e.g., Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475 (stating that when the victim-servicemember has two
policies, one under the SGL and one through a private life insurance carrier, the "choice of law
issue must be analyzed separately for each policy," and concluding federal common law applied to
the SGLI policy, but not to the private policy); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tolbert, 320 F. Supp.
2d 1378, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2004) (engaging in choice of law analysis because the "policies [were]
issued under a federal statute (SGLI) to afederal soldier," and concluding that therefore, the "Court
must turn to federal common law").
132. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 57-60 (1981) (emphasizing the SGLI's
pervasiveness and specificity, as well as the federal interest in government subsidy programs); see
also Mounts v. United States, 838 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (noting that its conclusion
that the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLI) preempts state law is consistent
with Ridgway's conclusion that the SGLI, modeled after the FEGLI, preempts state law).
133. Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475 (citations omitted) (stating that "in filling gaps left by Congress in a
federal program the courts seek to effectuate federal policies"); Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1380.
134. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475 (stating that "borrowing state law would be a mistake in the
case of soldiers' life insurance policies"); Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tull, 690 F.2d 848, 849
(4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1380 (stating that "the Court must turn to
federal common law"); Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 814 F. Supp. 500, 501 (W.D. Va. 1993)
(noting that the SGLI does not contain slayer's rule and stating that "courts interpreting the Act
have applied the Common Law 'slayer's rule' to prevent a beneficiary from profiting from his own
wrong"); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Neal, 768 F. Supp. 195, 197-98 (W.D. Tex. 1991) ("Because
the life insurance policy held [by the servicemember-victim] was a serviceman's life insurance
policy issued pursuant to the [SGLI], distribution of the proceeds of that policy is governed by
federal law.").
135. See, e.g., Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475 (concluding that federal law should govern issues relating
to SGLI policy distribution because the federal policies supporting the statute "should be governed
by a uniform set of rules untethered to any particular jurisdiction," and because the statute's
"detailed" order of preference provision demonstrates "Congress's desire for uniformity").
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B. Courts Have Employed the Common Law Slayer's Rule Under the
SGLI to Disqualify a Non-Servicemember Slayer from Benefiting
Directly as Primary Beneficiary
In four cases-Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Athmer,'
36
Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Tull,137 Prudential Insurance
Co. ofAmerica v. Tolbert,138 and Prudential Insurance Co. ofAmerica v.
Neal139-courts have considered the scope of the common law slayer's
rule under the SGLI where a non-servicemember slayer kills a
servicemember spouse.' 40 These cases illustrate the courts' consistent
application of the common law slayer's rule to disqualify the non-
servicemember slayer from directly benefiting as the primary
beneficiary.
141
Of these four cases, two-Athmer and Neal-addressed the SGLI's
silence on the slayer's rule by interpreting the statute as implicitly
embracing it.142 In Athmer, the Seventh Circuit stated that the "principle
that no person shall be permitted to benefit from the consequences of his
or her wrongdoing" is "undoubtedly an implicit provision of the
[SGLI] ... and it disqualifies [the slayer-spouse] from receiving any of
136. 178 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1999).
137. 690 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
138. 320 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (S.D. Ga. 2004)
139. 768 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Tex. 1991).
L 140. In each case, the non-servicemember spouse killed the servicemember and the policy was
issued under the SGLI. Athmer, 178 F.3d at 474; Tull, 690 F.2d at 848; Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at
1379; Neal, 768 F. Supp. at 197.
141. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 474, 476; Tull, 690 F.2d at 848-49; Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at
1379-80; Neal, 768 F. Supp. at 197-98. But see Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. 814 F. Supp.
500, 500-02 (W.D. Va. 1993) (holding that though the servicemember-husband had been convicted
of negligent homicide for driving drunk and killing his servicemember-wife in a car accident, there
was no evidence showing he intentionally killed her and Prudential did not face liability for paying
the victim-wife's proceeds to the husband because it did not know nor should have known the
husband may have been disqualified from receiving the payments under the SGLI, and therefore the
husband was not disqualified from receiving the proceeds).
142. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476; Neal, 768 F. Supp. at 198. In Neal, the court interpreted
language in the former 38 U.S.C. § 770(b) that is identical to the current, renumbered 38 U.S.C.
§ 1970(b) (2003), which provides, "[i]f any person otherwise entitled to payment under this
section ... is prohibited by [f]ederal statute or regulation, payment may be made in the order of
precedence as if such person had predeceased the member," as applying "not just to a person who is
barred from recovery by a federal statute or regulation, but also to a person who is barred from
recovery by the equitable principle that no one should benefit by her own wrong." Neal, 768 F.
Supp. at 198.
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the proceeds of [the victim-servicemember's] SGLI policy, even though
[the slayer-spouse] is the primary beneficiary named in it."'
143
Additionally, in each instance of disqualifying the non-
servicemember slayer from primary beneficiary status, the courts relied
on the equitable policy underlying the slayer's rule. 14 4 For instance, in
Tull, the Fourth Circuit stated, "[f]ederal law recognizes that the
beneficiary's claim is barred by the equitable defense: 'No person should
be permitted to profit from his own wrong."" 145 Thus, courts agree that
the non-servicemember slayer-spouse may not recover as primary
beneficiary on the victim-servicemember's SGLI policy.
Further, courts faced with the question of whether the victim-
servicemember's family members may recover the policy proceeds as
contingent beneficiaries (often replacing the non-servicemember slayer)
have answered in the affirmative. 146 In two cases-Tull and Neal-the
courts allowed the proceeds to go to the victim-servicemember's
children from a previous marriage, 147 and the victim-servicemember's
mother and daughter, 148 respectively.
Therefore, it appears that there are two settled principles regarding the
scope of the common law slayer's rule under the SGLI. First, the non-
servicemember slayer-spouse may not directly recover the victim-
servicemember's proceeds under the SGLI as the primary beneficiary.
49
Second, the victim-servicemember's family members may receive the
proceeds as beneficiaries "by law"'150 or contingent beneficiaries 15 1 in the
place of the disqualified non-servicemember slayer-spouse.
143. Athmer, 178 F.3d at 475-76.
144. See id.; Tull, 690 F.2d at 849; Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1380; Neal, 768 F. Supp. at 198.
145. Tull, 690 F.2d at 849 (quoting Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 263 F.2d 931, 932 (6th Cir. 1959)
(per curiam)).
146. See Tull, 690 F.2d at 848-49; Neal, 768 F. Supp. at 198-200.
147. See Tull, 690 F.2d at 848-49 (distributing the victim-servicemember's proceeds to his seven
children from a previous marriage where the victim-servicemember designated his proceeds "should
be distributed 'by law').
148. See Neal, 768 F. Supp. at 198-199 (distributing the proceeds of the victim-servicemember's
SGLI policy to his mother and daughter, whom he had named as contingent beneficiaries).
149. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476; Tull, 690 F.2d at 849; Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1380; Neal,
768 F. Supp. at 198. But see Jones v. Prudential Insurance Co. ofAmerica, which appears to be the
only existing exception to this general principle. 814 F. Supp. 500, 502 (W.D. Va. 1993) (allowing
servicemember-husband to recover proceeds of his servicemember-wife's SGLI policy though he
killed her in a car accident while driving drunk).
150. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 48 (1981) (using the term "by law" to indicate
situations where the servicemember has chosen to have the police proceeds be distributed under the
SGLI's statutory order of precedence); Tull, 690 F.2d at 848-49 (addressing distribution of an SGLI
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C. Courts Have Not Conclusively Adopted a Bright-Line, Extended
Slayer's Rule Disqualifying the Non-Servicemember Slayer's
Exclusive Family Members Under the SGLI
Courts have not yet interpreted the scope of the slayer's rule under the
recently included FSGLI provision. 152 The courts that have interpreted
the rule under the SGLI have not determined, conclusively, whether the
non-servicemember slayer's exclusive family members may receive the
victim-servicemember's policy proceeds. 153 Prudential Insurance Co. of
America v. Athmer and Prudential Insurance Co. of America v.
Tolbert-the two cases engaging in this debate-deal with the situation
where the non-servicemember spouse kills the servicemember. 15 4 In
Athmer, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's disqualification
of the non-servicemember slayer from primary beneficiary status, but
declined to adopt a bright-line, extended rule precluding the non-
servicemember slayer's son from a previous marriage from receiving the
victim-servicemember's proceeds. 55 However, in Tolbert, a district
court in Georgia-facing almost identical facts-picked up where
Athmer left off and adopted a bright-line extended slayer's rule to
disqualify both the non-servicemember slayer and the non-
servicemember slayer's mother and brother from receiving the victim-
servicemember's SGLI policy proceeds.1
56
policy where it "provided that its proceeds should be distributed 'by law').
151. See Neal, 768 F. Supp. at 197, 199-200.
152. Existing case law addresses the scope of the slayer's rule under the SGLI only. See Athmer,
178 F.3d at 474-76; Tull, 690 F.2d at 848-49; Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1379-81; Neal, 768 F.
Supp. at 197-98. These cases were decided before Congress amended the SGLI to include the
FSGLI provision. See Veterans' Survivor Benefits Improvements Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-14,
sec. 4, §§ 1965, 1967-70, 115 Stat. 25, 26-30 (2001).
153. Compare Athmer, 178 F.3d at 476-77 (leaving issue unresolved), with Tolbert, 320 F. Supp.
2d at 1380-81 (addressing issue and applying a bright-line, extended rule to disqualify the slayer's
exclusive relatives).
154. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 474 (non-servicemember wife had her lover murder her
servicemember-husband); Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1379-1380.
155. See Athmer, 178 F.3d at 474, 476-77 (noting the party who would have benefited from a
bright-line, extended rule had not argued it and therefore the court did not need to decide the issue).
156. See Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1379-82. Because the husband, the alleged slayer, had not
yet been civilly or criminally convicted at the time of this decision, the court's holding that the
husband and his mother and brother should be disqualified from receiving the victim-
servicemember's SGLI policy was contingent upon a trial court finding the husband civilly or
criminally liable for the wife's death. See id. at 1380, 1382-83.
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1. The Seventh Circuit Disqualified the Non-Servicemember Slayer
But Did Not Decide the Issue of Whether to Adopt a Bright-Line,
Extended Slayer's Rule
In Athmer, a case in which the wife-beneficiary had her lover murder
her servicemember-husband,1 57 the Seventh Circuit declined to decide
whether to adopt a bright-line extended slayer's rule. 158 First, the court
applied the slayer's rule to disqualify the non-servicemember slayer-wife
from primary beneficiary status under the policy. 59 Second, the court
addressed the issue of whether the non-servicemember slayer's son, who
had been named the contingent beneficiary on the SGLI policy, could
recover in her place. 60 Because the servicemember's daughter, the
appellant in the case, did not argue for a bright-line federal rule, the
court affirmed the lower court's judgment, which had allowed the non-
servicemember slayer's natural son (the victim-servicemember's
stepson) to receive the SGLI proceeds.' 6' Nevertheless, the court
engaged in a discussion of the policy concerns a court must consider in
formulating such a rule. 
62
In determining whether the slayer's son could receive the
servicemember-victim's policy, the court acknowledged that generally,
when circumstances disqualify the primary beneficiary from recovering
the proceeds, the contingent beneficiary takes the primary beneficiary's
place. 163 However, the court also recognized that where the contingent
157. Athmer, 178 F.3d at 474.
158. See id. at 477.
159. See id. at 475-76.
160. See id. at 474, 476. The court separately considered whether the slayer's sister could recover
as a contingent beneficiary under a private life insurance policy governed by state law, rather than
federal law. See id. at 474, 477-79.
161. See id. at 476-77, 479. On appeal, the victim-servicemember's natural daughter urged the
court to apply Illinois law. See id. at 477. Illinois's slayer's statute "forbids the murderer [from]
'receiv[ing] any property, benefit or other interest by reason of the death [of the murderer's victim],
whether as heir, legatee, beneficiary ... or in any other capacity."' Id. at 478. The daughter argued
that the definition of "benefit" was broad enough to encompass benefits passed to the slayer
indirectly, through family members. See id. On the other hand, the non-servicemember slayer's son
argued the court should apply federal law and adopt a uniform federal rule that would not
automatically disqualify the murderer's relatives. See id. at 477. The court agreed with the son that
federal law governed. See id. at 475. This disposed of the daughter's argument under Illinois law.
See id. at 477. Because the daughter did not argue for a uniform bright-line, extended rule, the court
did "not decide whether [a bright-line, extended slayer's rule] is or should be the federal common
law rule governing murders by beneficiaries of [SGLI] policies." Id.
162. See id. at 476-77.
163. See id. at 476. The Athmer court assumed that if the contingent beneficiary had murdered or
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beneficiary is related to the non-servicemember slayer, the family
member could pass the benefits on to the non-servicemember slayer,
creating the risk that the non-servicemember slayer could still benefit,
though indirectly, from the killing.i 64 The court noted that in a
hypothetical situation, the son could use the money to pay for his
mother's attorney's fees or to support her once released from prison.'
65
However, the court expressed concern that adopting a rule precluding
the non-servicemember slayer's exclusive family members from
recovering the servicemember-victim's proceeds would require courts to
engage in an "inherently speculative judgment about the future and an
investigation of family relations quite likely to be of Faulknerian
opacity.',
166
By not deciding the issue of whether a bright-line, extended slayer's
rule should exist, and by affirming the lower court's application of the
SGLI's beneficiary provision, the court allowed the son's recovery of
the policy proceeds to stand. 167 In so doing, the court stated, "[t]he
['murdering heir'] rule forbids the murderer to take under the will or
other instrument; it does not impress on the benefits a kind of reverse
constructive trust placing them forever beyond the murderer's reach."
' 168
Thus, the court declined to decide the scope of the slayer's rule under the
SGLI or to adopt a bright-line rule addressing whether a slayer's
exclusive relatives may recover policy proceeds.
2. The Tolbert Court Adopted a Bright-Line, Extended Slayer's Rule
to Bar the Non-Servicemember Slayer's Exclusive Family Members
from Recovering Under the SGLI
In Tolbert, a federal district court in Georgia, facing nearly identical
facts as the Seventh Circuit, adopted a bright-line, extended slayer's rule
to disqualify the non-servicemember slayer's exclusive relatives from
had contributed to the murder of the servicemember, the same policy of disqualifying the slayer
would apply to disqualify the contingent beneficiary. See id.
164. See id. at 476.
165. See id.
166. Id. at 478 (identifying policy concerns with a "murdering heir" rule like Illinois's, which
governed the victim-servicemember's private life insurance policies and which "requires the trial
court to make a factual determination whether allowing a relative of the murderer to take in the
place of the murderer is likely to confer a significant benefit on him").
167. Id. at 476-77, 479.
168. Id. at 476.
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receiving the victim-servicemember's policy proceeds. 69 As with the
Seventh Circuit, the Tolbert court first disqualified the non-
servicemember slayer from primary beneficiary status by applying the
slayer's rule to the SGLI policy. 70 Also like the Seventh Circuit, the
court then addressed the issue of whether the non-servicemember
slayer's exclusive relatives could receive the victim's policy proceeds
consistent with the common-law rule. 171
In considering this issue, the court looked to the Seventh Circuit's
discussion of the extended slayer's rule. 72 The court noted, however,
that the Seventh Circuit had not decided the issue because the argument
for a uniform, bright-line, extended rule disqualifying the slayer's
relatives "was not raised" in that case. 173 Nevertheless, the court
continued with the analysis the Seventh Circuit started, considering a
circumstance in which the non-servicemember slayer could benefit from
the killing if his mother and brother received the proceeds as
beneficiaries. 74 For instance, the court suggested that the mother could
use the money to pay for the slayer's defense, to buy the slayer legal
books in prison to prepare for an appeal of a possible conviction, or to
fund the slayer's prison account.175 The court reasoned that these
possibilities raised the grave risk that the non-servicemember slayer
could indirectly benefit, through his family members, from his act of
killing.'
76
Because of the serious risk that the non-servicemember slayer could
benefit from the killing through his or her exclusive family members, the
court disqualified the non-servicemember slayer's relatives from
receiving the benefits. 77 However, the court went a step further: it
adopted a bright-line, extended slayer's rule disqualifying a non-
169. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381-82 (S.D. Ga. 2004).
170. See id. at 1380 ("There is no dispute that the slayer's rule applies to [the slayer] ... .
171. Seeid. at 1379-81.
172. See id. at 1380-81. The court also looked to cases applying state law, though it still applied
federal common law. See id. at 1381 (citing Beck v. Downey, 198 F.2d 626, 628 (9th Cir. 1952)
(Alger Fee, J., concurring) (applying state law in diversity case), and In re Estate of Vallerius, 629
N.E.2d 1185 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994)).
173. Id. at 1381.
174. See id. (noting "there is no other authority deciding this question" and therefore the court
needed to turn to policy).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 1381-82.
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servicemember slayer's exclusive relatives from beneficiary status in all
instances. 78 As the court noted, other jurisdictions had applied an
extended slayer's rule to "disqualifly] all relatives other than those also
related to the victim" to "prevent killers from receiving even the
'indirect benefits' of their wrongdoing."1 79 The court explained that
while a bright-line, extended rule could be "unfair to honest relatives,"
such a rule "nevertheless allays all suspicion, drains at least that amount
of financial incentive out of money-driven murders, and supplies a
bright legal line."' 80 Thus, the policy concern motivating the slayer's
rule-that killers should not benefit from the act of killing-prompted
this court to adopt a bright-line rule barring all the slayer's exclusive
relatives from receiving the victim's life insurance proceeds under the
SGLI. '81
In sum, courts agree that the federal common law slayer's rule applies
to disqualify the non-servicemember slayer-spouse from primary
beneficiary status under the SGLI, but they have not conclusively
determined, through binding precedent, whether the non-servicemember
slayer's exclusive relatives can recover as contingent beneficiaries or as
beneficiaries under the statute's order of precedence provision. In each
instance, courts have relied on the policy of the slayer's rule to
disqualify the non-servicemember slayer-spouse from primary
beneficiary status or from beneficiary status under the statute's order of
precedence provision. On the one hand, courts have allowed the victim-
servicemember's relatives to receive the servicemember's SGLI
proceeds in place of the non-servicemember slayer-spouse, as contingent
beneficiaries or as beneficiaries under the statute's order of precedence
provision. On the other hand, courts have not adopted a binding bright-
line, extended slayer's rule disqualifying the non-servicemember
slayer's exclusive relatives from receiving the victim-servicemember's
SGLI proceeds as either contingent beneficiaries or beneficiaries under
the statute's order of precedence provision.






IV. COURTS INTERPRET STATUTES IN DEROGATION OF
COMMON LAW RULES SUCH AS THE SLAYER'S RULE
STRICTLY TO PRESERVE THE RULES
Courts use the canon of strict construction to interpret statutes in
derogation of common law doctrines. 82 Courts generally interpret
statutes consistently with the common law, absent an express
congressional statement abrogating the doctrine. 183 In the context of the
slayer's rule, courts have construed statutes strictly so as to preserve the
rule's mandate against allowing slayers to benefit from the act of
killing.
184
A. Courts Construe Federal Statutes Strictly, as Consistent With the
Common Law, Unless Congress Expressly Abrogates the Common
Law Rule
Courts interpret federal statutes as consistent with and preservative of
long-established common law doctrines, unless Congress explicitly
provides otherwise. 185 Analysis of whether a federal statute abrogates
well-established common law rules requires a court to determine
congressional intent. 186 Except where a statutory purpose expresses a
contrary intent, a court reads statutes in derogation of the common law
with a presumption favoring the long-established principles of the
common law.'87 This presumption means courts strictly interpret statutes
182. See Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879) (announcing rule of strict statutory
construction when statutes derogate common law).
183. See id. at 565 ("No statute is to be construed as altering the common law, farther than its
words import. It is not to be construed as making any innovation upon the common law which it
does not fairly express."); Reynolds v. Bement, 116 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 2005) ("A statute will be
construed in light of the common law unless the Legislature 'clearly and unequivocally' indicates
otherwise.") (quoting Cal. Ass'n of Health Facilities v. Dep't of Health Servs., 940 P.2d 323, 331
(Cal. 1997)).
184. See In re Estate of Vallerius, 629 N.E.2d 1185, 1188-89. (Il1. Ct. App. 1994) (construing a
state slayer's statute); Price v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470, 471-74 (Md. 1933) (interpreting state descent
and distribution statutes in light of common law slayer's rule and stating "the common law must be
allowed to stand unaltered as far as is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the new law").
185. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
186. See Stribling v. United States, 419 F.2d 1350, 1352 (8th Cir. 1969) (addressing proper
distribution of proceeds under a deceased servicemember's SGLI policy when the servicemember
may have changed his beneficiary designation, and stating "[i]t is axiomatic that congressional
intent is the guidepost to judicial interpretation of [flederal statutes").
187. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952).
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in derogation of common law' 88 and requires "that nothing be taken as
intended that is not clearly expressed."' 189 However, "[t]he rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed
does not require such an adherence to the letter as would defeat an
obvious legislative purpose or lessen the scope plainly intended to be
given to the measure."' 90 Under this approach to statutory construction, a
statute's scope may be restricted by common-law principles.' 9' For
instance, where a statute creates new benefits, its enforcement may be
limited by the powers inherent in courts of equity. 92 Generally, courts
employing this canon conclude that "[i]n the absence of any contrary
statutory authority, the common law rule must apply."'
' 93
B. Courts Have Adopted the Canon of Construction Requiring Strict
Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law in the
Context of the Slayer's Rule
Courts have adopted the canon of strict construction when faced with
application of the common law slayer's rule.' 94 These courts reason that
strictly construing statutes to preserve the contours of the common law
slayer's rule avoids absurd consequences. 195 For instance, in interpreting
188. See id.; Cal. Ass 'n of Health Facilities, 940 P.2d at 331.
189. Hapney v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 26 S.W.3d 771, 774 (Ark. 2000).
190. Isbrandtsen Co., 343 U.S. at 783 (quoting Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640
(1930)).
191. See Cal. Ass'n of Health Facilities, 940 P.2d at 331 (stating "unless expressly provided,
statutes should not be interpreted to alter the common law, and should be construed to avoid conflict
with common law rules").
192. See, e.g., United States v. Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. 847, 851, 853-54 (E.D. Mich. 1950)
(invoking inherent powers of court of equity to disqualify the insured's estranged, natural father
from receiving the insured's policy proceeds under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940
(NSLI), 38 U.S.C. § 1901, where the insured had designated his mother as primary beneficiary and
his step-father as contingent beneficiary, but where the step-father had murdered the mother,
disqualifying the step-father from beneficiary status and leaving the estranged natural father as the
beneficiary under the statute's order of precedence provision).
193. United States v. Foster, 238 F. Supp. 867, 868 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (applying common law
slayer's rule to preclude slayer from recovering victim-spouse's policy under the NSLI).
194. See In re Estate of Vallerius, 629 N.E.2d 1185, 1188-89. (111. App. Ct. 1994) (construing a
state slayer's statute to preserve the parameters of the slayer's rule); Price v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470,
473-74 (Md. 1933) (construing a state descent and distribution statute as consistent with the
common law slayer's rule). While these cases considered state statutes, rather than a federal benefits
scheme, the courts' rationale for choosing this canon is illustrative.
195. See Kwasniewski, 91 F. Supp. at 853 (refusing to interpret the NSLI's order of precedence
provision as requiring distribution of the deceased-insured's policy proceeds to the insured's natural
father where the father was estranged, though the insured's mother and step-father, the primary and
Slayers and Soldiers
a state slayer's statute, one court stated, "[w]e cannot construe the broad
language of the statute in so technical and rigid a fashion that its
application violates longstanding public policy or serves to unjustly
increase the estate of one who participates in murder."'1 96 In that case, the
court addressed the issue of whether the slayers, two grandsons, could
inherit the estate of their grandmother, who they had murdered, through
their mother, who died intestate but who had been the sole inheritor of
the grandmother's estate.1 97 The slayer's statute at issue disqualified
from beneficiary status a person who "intentionally and unjustifiably
causes" a person's death. 98 The court rejected one grandson's argument
that because he did not actually swing the sledgehammer that killed his
grandmother, he did not "cause" the death and therefore could not be
disqualified from inheriting his grandmother's estate through his
mother. 199 In rejecting this argument, the court explained "the word
'causes' . . . encompasses the actions of one participating in the
intentional and unjustifiable death of another, whether as an aider and
abettor, a coconspirator, or one who hires another to kill the
decedent.,200 The court, in applying the statute to bar the grandson from
receiving "any property, benefit, or interest from the estate," refused to
"read into the statute words of limitation that are not there, particularly
since the limitation espoused by [the grandson] would be directly
contrary to the strong public policy that murderers should be denied the
fruits of their crimes.",20 1 Instead, the court construed the state slayer's
statute to preserve the common law slayer's rule and thus disqualified
the grandson.20 2
contingent beneficiaries, could not recover because the step-father had murdered the mother, and
reasoning that "[h]aving rid himself of the responsibilities of the father-child relationship, it would
be unconscionable and contrary to justice and public policy to permit him at this time to reap any
benefits as a result of the death of a child to whom he once bore such relationship but which
relationship he disavowed by his acts many years ago"); In re Estate of Vallerius, 629 N.E.2d at
1188; Price, 165 A. at 471 ("If there arises out of [statutes] collaterally any absurd consequences,
manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences,
void." (quoting William Blackstone, I Commentaries *91)).
196. See In re Estate of Vallerius, 629 N.E.2d at 1188.
197. See id. at 1186.
198. Id. at 1188.
199. See id. at 1187-88.
200. Id. at 1188.
201. Id. at 1188-89.
202. See id.
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Similarly, an early case dealing with the issue of statutory
construction in the context of the slayer's rule explained that "provisions
of a will and the statutes of descent and distribution should be
interpreted in the light of those universally recognized principles of
justice and morality., 20 3 The court further stated that "such interpretation
is justified and compelled by the public policy embraced in those
principles or maxims, which must control the interpretation of law,
statutes, and contracts. 20 4 In holding that the slayer's rule applied to a
state descent and distribution statute, as well as to private insurance
policies, the court reasoned that "common-law equitable maxims must
be taken into consideration and applied in the interpretation of statutes as
well as contracts. 20 5 According to the court, "[s]tatutes are likewise to
be construed in reference to the principles of the common law; for it
must not be presumed that the legislature intended to make any
innovation upon the common law, further than the case absolutely
required.
20 6
In sum, courts interpret statutes strictly to preserve common law rules
when such statutes do not expressly abrogate common law doctrines. In
particular, courts have adopted this canon of strict construction when
applying the common law slayer's rule under a statute. To preserve the
common law slayer's rule and its mandate that slayers should not benefit
from their murderous acts, courts construe statutes directing distribution
of proceeds strictly.
V. COURTS SHOULD CONSTRUE THE FSGLI STRICTLY TO
DISQUALIFY THE SERVICEMEMBER-SLAYER'S
EXCLUSIVE FAMILY MEMBERS
Because Congress did not expressly abrogate the common law
slayer's rule in the FSGLI, 20 7 courts should construe the statute as
consistent with and preservative of the rule.208 When the servicemember
kills his or her spouse and the FSGLI governs the issue of policy
203. Price v. Hitaffer, 165 A. 470, 470 (Md. 1933) (rejecting argument that disqualifying the
slayer worked a corruption of blood in violation of constitutional provisions).
204. Id. at 470.
205. See id. at 474.
206. Id. at 473 (quoting James Kent, I Commentaries *464).
207. See infra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.




distribution, courts should follow the Tolbert court's lead and apply a
bright-line, extended slayer's rule to disqualify the servicemember-
slayer's exclusive family members from either contingent or by-law
beneficiary status.20 9 This approach properly preserves the mandate of
the slayer's rule that a killer should not belefit from the act of killing.
Further, under the canon of strict construction that courts apply to
statutes in derogation of the common law slayer's rule, courts construing
the FSGLI should, where the servicemember spouse killed the non-
servicemember spouse, reach the Tolbert court's conclusion of
disqualifying the servicemember-slayer's exclusive relatives from
receiving the policy benefits. 210 Therefore, the proper approach to
determining who should receive the insurance benefits under the FSGLI
requires courts to construe the beneficiary provisions strictly in accord
with the principle that prohibits killers from benefiting from their
criminal acts, whether directly as primary beneficiaries or indirectly
through their exclusive family members.
A. The Plain Language and Legislative History of the FSGLI Reveals
Congress Did Not Intend to Abrogate the Common Law Slayer's
Rule
Congress did not expressly abrogate the common law slayer's rule in
either the text or the legislative history of the FSGLI.211 Indeed, the
statute's text and legislative history are silent on the slayer's rule.21 2
Congress also did not enact the SGLI or the newer FSGLI provision as a
substitute for the common law slayer's rule or to displace the rule and its
principles through codified law.2 13 Instead, Congress intended the
FSGLI to serve a relatively limited purpose: to extend life insurance
benefits to servicemembers' family, specifically spouses and dependent
209. Cf Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381-82 (S.D. Ga. 2004)
(arguing for bright-line rule under SGLI when the servicemember was the victim, not the slayer).
210. See supra notes 194-206, 177-181 and accompanying text.
211. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-1979 (2003); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473,
476 (7th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 814 F. Supp. 500, 501 (W.D. Va. 1993).
212. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-1979; Jones, 814 F. Supp. at 501. See also generally Veterans'
Survivor Benefits Improvements Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-14, § 4, 115 Stat. 25, 26-30 (2001);
H.R. REP. No. 107-27 (2001), as reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 23; HANDBOOK, supra note 8.
213. See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-1979; see also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779,
783 (1952) (stating in absence of express congressional intent, presumption is in favor of
interpreting statutes to preserve the common law).
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children.)' In the absence of an express statement to the contrary,
Congress could not have intended courts to apply the FSGLI in so
mechanical a fashion as to allow a servicemember-slayer to benefit,
through the servicemember-slayer's family, from his or her act of
killing.
B. Courts Should Apply an Extended Slayer's Rule to Determine
Payment of Proceeds Under the FSGLI Where the Slayer Is the
Servicemember
Where the slayer is a servicemember, courts should apply an extended
slayer's rule to preclude the servicemember's exclusive family members
from beneficiary status under the FSGLI. Courts employing an extended
slayer's rule have identified two main justifications for disqualifying the
servicemember slayer's exclusive relatives, even innocent members:
first, ensuring the slayer does not receive, through relatives, the financial
benefits of the killing;21 5 and second, ensuring the slayer cannot inherit
or otherwise control, through relatives, the proceeds from the victim's
policy. 216 When a servicemember kills his or her spouse and the FSGLI
governs payment of policy proceeds, both of these justifications are
triggered.
First, under the FSGLI, the servicemember-slayer's family members
will most likely replace the servicemember as beneficiary.217 Under the
FSGLI, the non-servicemember spouse cannot designate beneficiaries. 218
Instead, the non-servicemember spouse's policy proceeds go to either
the servicemember-slayer's choice of beneficiaries or family members
(beneficiaries by law).219 In the absence of children in common with the
victim, 2 ° under the statute's order of precedence provision, the proceeds
go first to any children the servicemember has from previous or other
relationships, then to the servicemember's parents, and if none, then to
214. See 38 U.S.C. § 1965(10)(A)-(B), § 1967(a)(1); Pub. L. No. 107-14, § 4, 115 Stat. at 25-30;
H.R. REP. No. 107-27 (2001), as reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N at 30-36.
215. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
218. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a), (i); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at ch. 6.01-6.02 (defining scope of
servicemembers' authority to designate beneficiaries).
219. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a), (i).
220. This Comment does not argue that children the servicemember-slayer and victim-spouse





the servicemember's appointed executor or administrator, and if none,
then to the servicemember's next of kin.22' Therefore, the
servicemember slayer's exclusive family members will most likely
receive the victim's policy benefits.
Because Spc. Bare's father received the proceeds from the victim-
wife's policy and allegedly indicated his intent to use the proceeds to
support his slayer-son in prison,222 Spc. Bare's case exemplifies the
grave possibility that the servicemember-slayer will benefit from the
killing through family members. Such a situation contradicts the purpose
and policy of the slayer's rule's mandate.223 Therefore, despite the risk
that innocent family members may be precluded from beneficiary
status,224 courts should apply an extended slayer's rule under the FSGLI
where the servicemember is the slayer. Invoking this extended rule to
disqualify the servicemember-slayer's exclusive relatives under the
FSGLI avoids reaching the unconscionable result that the
servicemember-slayer could financially benefit indirectly from the
criminal act.225
Second, the concern that the servicemember-slayer could inherit the
proceeds through family members should compel courts to apply an
extended slayer's rule under the FSGLI. Where no children in common
with the victim exist, and where the servicemember did not designate
non-familial beneficiaries, the servicemember's parents receive the
victim's policy proceeds first,226 as occurred in Spc. Bare's case.227
Under these circumstances, the servicemember-slayer stands to inherit
the proceeds from the parents, who likely will not outlive the
servicemember-slayer. This possibility raises the serious risk the
servicemember-slayer will benefit financially from the act of killing.22 8
The fact that this risk would exist contradicts the common law slayer's
221. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a).
222. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
224. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381 (S.D. Ga. 2004)
(considering the fact that a bright-line, extended rule would avoid "undesirable speculation" into
family relations, but "at the expense of honest relatives who would not otherwise collaborate with
the slayer").
225. See id. (balancing these risks).
226. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a), (i).
227. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
1001
Washington Law Review
rule's maxim and frustrates principles of equity. 229 For these reasons,
courts applying the FSGLI to questions of policy payment where the
servicemember killed the spouse should apply an extended slayer's rule
to disqualify the servicemember-slayer's exclusive relatives from
beneficiary status.
C. The Tolbert Court's Bright-Line Approach Disqualifying the
Slayer's Exclusive Family Members Under the SGLI Properly
Preserves the Mandate of the Slayer's Rule
The Tolbert court's bright-line approach to the issue of whether the
servicemember-slayer's exclusive family members can recover as
beneficiaries under the SGLI correctly embraces the policy underlying
the rule.230 Because this approach cuts the slayer entirely off from any
financial benefits that might flow, directly or indirectly, from the
killing,' it better effectuates the principle of the slayer's rule than a
simple application of the statute's order of precedence.232
In Tolbert, the court reasoned that the risk that the non-
servicemember slayer could benefit indirectly through relatives that
receive the victim-servicemember's policy benefits under the SGLI
required disqualifying the relatives from beneficiary status. 233 In
particular, the court considered the risk that the mother and brother
would use the victim-servicemember's policy proceeds to provide
234financial support to the non-servicemember slayer, thereby indirectly
benefiting the slayer and violating the slayer's rule.235 The court
reasoned that the possibility of such a benefit to the slayer outweighed
the risk that innocent family members might be disqualified.236
Thus, courts applying the slayer's rule under the FSGLI should,
where the servicemember kills the spouse, follow the Tolbert court's
229. See Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 ("On balance, [a bright-line extended rule] is a better
practice than its non-extended version."); see also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d
473, 477 (7th Cir. 1999) (deciding not to determine whether to adopt a bright-line, extended rule
where such a rule was not argued and instead affirming the lower court's judgment allowing the
slayer's son to receive the victim's SGLI policy proceeds).
233. See Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
234. See supra notes 174-181 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 174-181 and accompanying text.




lead. Under the FSGLI, the servicemember-slayer controls the
beneficiary designation 237 and, where the servicemember has no children
in common with the victim and did not designate other beneficiaries, the
servicemember stands to benefit through his or her exclusive relatives,
including parents.238 To fulfill the purpose of the slayer's rule, courts
should adopt the Tolbert court's bright-line extended slayer's rule to
disqualify the servicemember-slayer's exclusive family members from
beneficiary status. This approach would ensure that the servicemember-
slayer does not benefit indirectly, either through relatives establishing
bank accounts for the slayer, as was alleged in the Spc. Bare case,239 or
through inheritance.
Further, where the issue of the rule's scope arises in the context of
FSGLI policies and the servicemember's criminal act of killing, this
approach avoids the possibility that courts might, in the absence of a
clear rule, reach conclusions that lead to unconscionable results. In
Athmer, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment
allowing the slayer's son to recover the victim's SGLI policy proceeds
because the party who would benefit from such a uniform bright-line
extended slayer's rule did not argue it.240 In affirming the lower court,
the Seventh Circuit considered the possibility that the slayer could
benefit indirectly through relatives.241 While acknowledging this risk,
the court affirmed the lower court's judgment on other grounds,
allowing the slayer's son to receive the insurance benefits.242 Because
the risk the slayer could benefit from the act of killing indirectly,
through family members, violates the slayer's rule and leads to
unconscionable results, courts should instead decide the issue
affirmatively and disqualify the slayer's exclusive relatives.
243
For these reasons, where the servicemember is the slayer and the
victim is a non-servicemember spouse covered under the FSGLI's
insurance program, courts should follow the Tolbert court's reasoning
and adopt its bright-line rule to disqualify the servicemember-slayer's
exclusive relatives from receiving the policy benefits. This approach
237. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a) (2003); HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at chs. 6.01, 6.02.
238. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a), (i).
239. See supra notes 8-9, 11 and accompanying text.
240. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1999); supra note 161
and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 163-166 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
243. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1380-82 (S.D. Ga. 2004).
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properly fulfills and preserves the mandate of the slayer's rule while
avoiding the unconscionable result that the servicemember-slayer could
benefit in any way from the act of killing.
D. Courts Interpreting the Slayer's Rule Under the FSGLI Must
Construe the Statute Strictly, Requiring Courts to Reach the Same
Result as the Tolbert Court
Courts interpreting questions regarding the payment of insurance
benefits under the FSGLI should adopt the canon requiring strict
statutory construction. Construing the FSGLI strictly means interpreting
and applying it to preserve the slayer's rule and purpose: barring slayers
from benefiting from the act of killing. 244 The Tolbert court implicitly
employed this canon to adopt the bright-line rule disqualifying all of the
non-servicemember slayer's relatives from beneficiary status.245 In fact,
to reach its conclusion, the Tolbert court had to construe the SGLI's
beneficiary provision strictly, refusing to apply it without regard to the
policy underlying the slayer's rule.246 A contrary application of the
statute would have required the court to allow the non-servicemember
slayer's mother and brother to receive the proceeds, thereby creating the
risk the non-servicemember slayer would prosper from the act of
killing.247
The policy underlying the slayer's rule-that killers should not
benefit from the act of killing-motivated the Tolbert court to construe
the SGLI's beneficiary provision strictly. Indeed, the Tolbert court stated
that "justice" required disqualifying the non-servicemember slayer's
relatives from receiving the proceeds as beneficiaries.248 In implicitly
employing this canon of construction, the court looked to a state court
case construing a slayer's statute strictly. 249 Further, in strictly
construing the statute, the court reached the conclusion the Seventh
Circuit decided it did not need to reach. 250 By extending the Seventh
244. See supra Part IV.
245. See supra notes 178-181 and accompanying text.
246. See Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1380-82.
247. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a), (i) (2003).
248. Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 n.3.
249. See id. at 1381; supra notes 179, 196-202 and accompanying text.
250. See Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1381 ("[The Seventh Circuit] expressly noted that it 'need
not decide whether that is or should be the federal common law rule governing murders by




Circuit's discussion and coming to its own conclusion, the Tolbert court
fulfilled the mandate of the slayer's rule.25'
Thus, courts construing the FSGLI should interpret the statute strictly
to give the slayer's rule full effect where the servicemember kills the
spouse. In so doing, courts will reach the same conclusion as the Tolbert
court: allowing the servicemember-slayer's exclusive family members to
recover the proceeds as designated or by-law beneficiaries under the
statute would lead to the unconscionable result that the slayer could
benefit from the killing.252 Therefore, a strict construction of the statute
should lead courts to disqualify the servicemember-slayer's exclusive
family members from beneficiary status.
Further, strictly construing the FSGLI where the servicemember kills
the spouse ensures that though the servicemember-slayer has the
statutorily-mandated discretion to designate beneficiaries, and though
the servicemember-slayer's relatives will be the beneficiaries under the
statute's order of precedence, the servicemember-slayer will not benefit
from the act of murder. 253 Either through intentional or by law
designations, the servicemember-slayer's family members will generally
be the contingent beneficiaries on the non-servicemember spouse's
policy under the FSGLI. 5 Under these circumstances, the financial
benefits from the victim-spouse's policy could be passed to the
servicemember-slayer through the servicemember-slayer's family
members. 255 Allowing the servicemember-slayer's relatives to receive
the benefits of the victim-spouse's policy under the FSGLI creates the
grave risk that the servicemember-slayer will receive the benefits of the
act of killing.256 Nothing in the SGLI or FSGLI demonstrates Congress
intended the unconscionable result that servicemembers could receive
the financial rewards through their family members for the act of killing
spouses covered under the FSGLI.257 Therefore, courts should, where the
servicemember kills the spouse, interpret the FSGLI strictly. This strict
construction would lead courts to follow the Tolbert court's bright-line
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See 38 U.S.C. § 1970(a), (i) (2003).
254. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 91-111 and accompanying text.
256. Cf Tolbert, 320 F. Supp. 2dat 1381.
257. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1965-1979 (2003).
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rule of disqualification and thereby fulfill the mandate of the slayer's
rule.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress did not abrogate the slayer's rule in either the SGLI or the
FSGLI. Where the servicemember kills the spouse and the court must
determine whether the servicemember's exclusive family members may
receive the victim's proceeds under the FSGLI, courts should apply an
extended slayer's rule to disqualify the family members. Case law
involving both state slayer's statutes and the SGLI supports this
conclusion. Additionally, the canon of strict statutory construction
invoked by courts construing statutes in derogation of the common law
slayer's rule leads courts to this result. A contrary application of the
FSGLI provisions would lead to the possibility that the servicemember-
slayer could benefit indirectly from the killing. This risk both violates
the mandate of the slayer's rule and leads to unconscionable results.
Therefore, courts addressing this issue should adopt a bright-line rule
disqualifying the slayer's family members in the strict circumstances
discussed in this Comment: where the servicemember kills the spouse
and the FSGLI governs the spouse's policy.
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